## Wake LW Intralocality K vs Emory JS

### 1NC

**Moore 11**

 (Darnell L. Moore 2011, writer and activist whose work is informed by anti-racist, feminist, queer of color, and anti-colonial thought and advocacy. Darnell's essays, social commentary, poetry, and interviews have appeared in various national and international media venues, including the Feminist Wire, Ebony magazine, and The Huffington Post, "On Location: The “I” in the Intersection," http://thefeministwire.com/2011/12/on-location-the-i-in-the-intersection/)

The most general statement of our politics at the present time would be that we are actively committed to struggling against racial, sexual, heterosexual, and class oppression and see as our particular ask the development of integrated analysis and practice based upon the fact that the major systems of oppression are interlocking. The synthesis of these oppressions creates the conditions of our lives. As black women we see black feminism as the logical political movement to combat the manifold and simultaneous oppressions that all women of color face. -The Combahee River Collective in A Black Feminist Statement Many radical movement builders are well-versed in the theory of intersectionality. Feminists, queer theorists and activists, critical race scholars, progressive activists, and the like owe much to our Black feminist sisters, like The Combahee River Collective, who introduced us to the reality of simultaneity–as a framework for assessing the multitude of interlocking oppressions that impact the lives of women of color–in A Black Feminist Statement (1978). Their voices and politics presaged Kimberlé Crenshaw’s very useful theoretical contribution of “intersectionality” to the feminist toolkit of political interventions in 1989. Since its inception, many have referenced the term—sometimes without attribution to the black feminist intellectual [genealogy](http://thefeministwire.com/2011/12/on-location-the-i-in-the-intersection/) froqm which it emerged—as a form of en vogue progressive parlance. In fact, it seems to be the case that it is often referenced in progressive circles as a counterfeit license (as in, “I understand the ways that race, sexuality, class, and gender coalesce. I get it. I really do.”) to enter resistance work even if the person who declares to have a deep “understanding” of the connectedness of systemic matrices of oppression, themselves, have yet to discern and address their own complicity in the maintenance of the very oppressions they seek to name and demolish. I am certain that I am not the only person who has heard a person use language embedded with race, class, gender, or ability privilege follow-up with a reference to “intersectionality.” My concern, then, has everything to do with the way that the fashioning of intersectionality as a political framework can lead toward the good work of analyzing ideological and material systems of oppression—as they function “out there”—and away from the great work of critical analyses of the ways in which we, ourselves, can function as actants in the narratives of counter-resistance that we rehearse. In other words, we might be missing the opportunity to read our complicities, our privileges, our accesses, our excesses, our excuses, our modes of oppressing—located “in here”—as they occupy each of us. Crenshaw’s theorization has provided us with a useful lens to assess the problematics of the interrelated, interlocking apparatuses of power and privilege and their resulting epiphenomena of powerlessness and subjugation. Many have focused on the external dimensions of oppression and their material results manifested in the lives of the marginalized, but might our times be asking of us to deeply consider our own “stuff” that might instigate such oppressions? What if we extended Crenshaw’s theory of intersectionality by invoking what we might name “intralocality”? Borrowing from sociologists, the term “social location,” which broadly speaks to one’s context, highlights one’s standpoint(s)—the social spaces where s/he is positioned (i.e. race, class, gender, geographical, etc.). Intralocality, then, is concerned with the social locations that foreground our knowing and experiencing of our world and our relationships to the systems and people within our world. Intralocality is a call to theorize the self in relation to power and privilege, powerlessness and subjugation. It is work that requires the locating of the “I” in the intersection. And while it could be argued that such work is highly individualistic, I contend that it is at the very level of self-in-relation-to-community where communal transformation is made possible. Might it be time to travel into the deep of our contexts? Might it be time for us—theorists/activists—to do the work of intersectionality (macro/system-analysis) in concert with the intra-local (micro/self-focused analysis)? Intersectionality as an analysis, rightly, asks of us to examine systemic oppressions, but in these times of radical and spontaneous insurgencies—times when we should reflect on our need to unoccupy those sites of privilege (where they exist) in our own lives even as we occupy some other sites of domination—work must be done at the level of the self-in-community. We cannot—as a progressive community—rally around notions of “progression” and, yet, be complicit in the very homo/transphobias, racisms, sexisms, ableisms, etc. that violently terrorize the lives of so many others. If a more loving and just community is to be imagined and advanced, it seems to me that we would need to start at a different location than we might’ve expected: self.

**Margulies and Metcalf argue**

(“Terrorizing Academia” <http://www.swlaw.edu/pdfs/jle/jle603jmarguilies.pdf>, Joseph Margulies is a Clinical Professor, Northwestern University School of Law. He was counsel of record for the petitioners in Rasul v. Bush and Munaf v. Geren. He now is counsel of record for Abu Zubaydah, for whose torture (termed harsh interrogation by some) Bush Administration officials John Yoo and Jay Bybee wrote authorizing legal opinions. Earlier versions of this paper were presented at workshops at the American Bar Foundation and the 2010 Law and Society Association Conference in Chicago. Margulies expresses his thanks in particular to Sid Tarrow, Aziz Huq, BaherAzmy, Hadi Nicholas Deeb, Beth Mertz, Bonnie Honig, and Vicki Jackson. Hope Metcalf is a Lecturer, Yale Law School. Metcalf is co-counsel for the plaintiffs/petitioners in Padilla v. Rumsfeld, Padilla v. Yoo, Jeppesen v. Mohammed, and Maqaleh v. Obama. She has written numerous amicus briefs in support of petitioners in suits against the government arising out of counterterrorism policies, including in Munaf v. Geren and Boumediene v. Bush. Metcalf expresses her thanks to Muneer Ahmad, Stella Burch Elias, Margot Mendelson, Jean Koh Peters, and Judith Resnik for their feedback, as well as to co-teachers Jonathan Freiman, RamziKassem, Harold HongjuKoh and Michael Wishnie, whose dedication to clients, students and justice continues to inspire., Journal of Legal Education, Volume 60, Number 3 (February 2011))

This conundrum is not adequately addressed by dominant strands of post-9/11 legal scholarship. In retrospect, it is surprising that much post-9/11 scholarship appears to have set aside critical lessons from previous decades as to the relationship among law, society and politics.14 Many scholars have long argued in other contexts that rights—or at least the experience of rights—are subject to political and social constraints, particularly for groups subject to historic marginalization. Rather than self-executing, rights are better viewed as contingent political resources, capable of mobilizing public sentiment and generating social expectations.15 From that view, a victory in Rasul or Boumediene no more guaranteed that prisoners at Guantánamo would enjoy the right to habeas corpus than a victory in Brown v. Board 16 guaranteed that schools in the South would be desegregated.17 Rasul and Boumediene, therefore, should be seen as part (and probably only a small part) of a varied and complex collection of events, including the fiasco in Iraq, the scandal at the Abu Ghraib prison, and the use of warrantless wiretaps, as well as seemingly unrelated episodes like the official response to Hurricane Katrina. These and other events during the Bush years merged to give rise to a powerful social narrative critiquing an administration committed to lawlessness, content with incompetence, and engaged in behavior that was contrary to perceived “American values.”18 Yet the very success of this narrative, culminating in the election of Barack Obama in 2008, produced quiescence on the Left, even as it stimulated massive opposition on the Right. The result has been the emergence of a counter-narrative about national security that has produced a vigorous social backlash such that most of the Bush-era policies will continue largely unchanged, at least for the foreseeable future.19 Just as we see a widening gap between judicial recognition of rights in the abstract and the observation of those rights as a matter of fact, there appears to be an emerging dominance of proceduralist approaches, which take as a given that rights dissolve under political pressure, and, thus, are best protected by basic procedural measures. But that stance falls short in its seeming readiness to trade away rights in the face of political tension. First, it accepts the tropes du jour surrounding radical Islam—namely, that it is a unique, and uniquely apocalyptic, threat to U.S. security. In this, proceduralists do not pay adequate heed to the lessons of American history and sociology. And second, it endorses too easily the idea that procedural and structural protections will protect against substantive injustice in the face of popular and/or political demands for an outcome-determinative system that cannot tolerate acquittals. Procedures only provide protection, however, if there is sufficient political support for the underlying right. Since the premise of the proceduralist scholarship is that such support does not exist,it is folly to expect the political branches to create meaningful and robust protections. In short, a witch hunt does not become less a mockery of justice when the accused is given the right to confront witnesses. And a separate system (especially when designed for demonized “others,” such as Muslims) cannot, by definition, be equal. In the end, we urge a fuller embrace of what Scheingold called “the politics of rights,” which recognizes the contingent character of rights in American society. We agree with Mari Matsuda, who observed more than two decades ago that rights are a necessary but not sufficient resource for marginalized people with little political capital.20 To be effective, therefore, we must look beyond the courts and grapple with the hard work of long-term change with, through and, perhaps, in spite of law. These are by no means new dilemmas, but the post-9/11 context raises difficult and perplexing questions that deserve study and careful thought as our nation settles into what appears to be a permanent emergency

Nagel and Nocella 13 (The End of Prisons: Reflections from the Decarceration Movementedited by Mechthild E. Nagel, Anthony J. Nocella II)

The original working title for this volume was Prison Abolition. After discussion among the contributors however, we changed the title to The End of Prisons. First, we wish to raise discussions about the telos of prisons – what purpose do they have?Second, Prison abolition is strongly related to a particular movement to end the prison industrial complex. Following Michel Foucault(1977), we argue that prisons are also institutions such as schools, nursing homes, jails, daycare centers, parks, zoos, reservations and marriage, just to name a few. Prisons are all around us and constructed by those in dominant oppressive authoritarian positions. There are many types of prisons – religious prisons, social prisons, political prisons, economic prisons, educational prisons, and, of course, criminal prisons. Individuals leave one prison only to enter another. From daycare to school to a nursing home, we are a nation of instutionalized prisons. Criminal prisons in the United States are not officially referred to as such, but rather as correctional facilities. A prison, as we define it in this volume, is an institution or system that oppresses and does not allow freedom for a particular group. Within this definition, we include the imprisonment of non-human animals and plants, which are too often overlooked. Michel Foucault (1977) famously said, “Is it suprising that prisons resemble factories, schools, barracks, hospitals, which all resemble prisons?” (p. 288). We believe that this volume is one of the first to extend Foucault’s logica, by making a connection between coercive institutions and all systems of domination as forms of prisons. We argue that the conception of prison is far reaching, always changing and adapting to the times and the socio-political environment. We expand the concept of prison from concrete walls, barbed wire, gates and fences to many of the institutions and systems throughout society such as schools, mental hospitals, reservations for indigenous Americans, zoos for non-human animals, and national parks and urban cultivated green spaces for the ecological community. United States imperialism, which promotes global domination and capitalism, not only imprisons convicted criminals byt its people, land, non-human animals, those that surround it (non-United States citizens) and those trapped within it (American Indians and immigrants).

**Sexton 5**

(Racial Profiling and the Societies of Control¶ Jared Sexton¶ Forthcoming in Joy James (ed.) Warfare in the Homeland: ¶ Incarceration in the United States (Durham: Duke UP),

It no doubt strikes one as counterintuitive to think about the proliferation of multiracial coalition politics, or rather the political mobilization of non-black people of color, as either an index of black powerlessness or, worse, a component of an active black disempowerment instituted via large-scale domestic structural adjustments. There is, after all, an almost universal acknowledgement among activists and organizers in Latino, Asian American, and more recently, Arab and Muslim communities that the Civil Rights and Black Power movements were seminal to their current efforts (and occasional successes), both as practical training grounds for many a veteran political worker and as a continuing source of inspiration and instruction for younger generations now moving into the ranks of leadership. More importantly, consistent attempts are made to link, at least rhetorically, analogically, the struggle for immigrant rights (to use admittedly deficient shorthand) with the ongoing black struggle for racial justice.[[1]](#footnote-1) This is usually done in order to promote a more effective and lasting spirit of collaboration among different communities of color; an antidote for the destructive dynamics of “Black/Asian conflict” or “Blacks vs. Browns” and so on, and a precondition for viable coalition, a search for common ground.[[2]](#footnote-2) ¶ However, upon closer examination one detects in the public commentary about both the histories of oppression and the contemporary forms of racial discrimination faced by non-black people of color not only a certain carelessness (a point I’ve already made), but also a strong undercurrent of open disdain toward the recent career of blacks in the US, a subtext of anti-blackness that appears to be both gratuitous (because it is not logically required by the arguments at hand, one can simply present the case as is, sans analogy) and utterly indispensable (because it is never not present in discernible form). We do not find, in other words, a coherent rationale for the animus that seems to lace the strategic calls for multiracial coalition or the conceptual deployment of metaphor between the station of blacks in US society and culture and the evolving attacks on the welfare of non-black minorities. In each case, a claim is made that, say, the vicious assault on immigration reform (from bilingual education programs to health and human services for the undocumented to the militarization of the border), or the spectacular skepticism of government investigative agencies and the corporate media toward the loyalties of Asian Americans as such (from Japanese internment to the Democratic campaign contribution fracas to the Wen Ho Lee affair), or the implementation of aggressive policing against an “Arab-Muslim-Middle Eastern” terrorist profile, etc. are offenses more egregious than those which have been happening to blacks in far greater proportion for nearly indefinite periods of time; in part because all of this is ostensibly unacknowledged as such, not by whites so much as by blacks. ¶ Black suffering, in other words, is utilized as a convenient point of reference – the putative bottom line – in such a way that the specificity of anti-blackness, which is to say its inexorableness and fundamentality to racial formation in the United States, is almost entirely obscured. Meanwhile, blacks are faulted for failing to validate, as it were, and embrace the political claims of non-black people of color. (We might be forgiven for wondering how its is that blacks are constituted here as a court of appeal or an audience, even, in the first place, a question preliminary to any investigation of whether or to what extent blacks do or should or can recognize such claims.)¶ What the multiracial approach fails to appreciate – aside from the inherent injury and insult to the usual suspects of becoming concerned about a problem only when it happens immediately to you and yours – is the highly contingent nature of the injustices in question. This is, perhaps, the most tendentious point of the present argument: whether one is talking about the attack on immigrants or the special registrations of Homeland Security, or even harkening back to the internment of Japanese Americans during WW II, it is not unreasonable to conclude that these undeniably reprehensible and tragic events were nonetheless inessential – though clearly not unimportant – to the operations of the US state and civil society (i.e., it could have done otherwise without fear of crisis, catastrophe or collapse). The mass imprisonment of citizens and non-citizens of Japanese descent, for instance, was dependent upon both the hysteria of the Second World War and the foreign policy objectives of the Roosevelt Administration as a sufficient condition of possibility; the necessary condition was, to put it crudely, the history of anti-Asian racism in the US.[[3]](#footnote-3) The harassment, deportation, and demonizing effected by Homeland Security is fully entangled in the geopolitics of the post-Cold War US Grand Strategy and the unabated warfare required for capturing outstanding oil reserves, illicit drug markets, and natural resources that are becoming absolutely scarce.[[4]](#footnote-4) The anti-immigration movement likewise must be understood as a key component of the regional integration of the Americas and Pacific Rim (to recite the acronyms: NAFTA, FTAA, APEC, etc. viz. IMF/World Bank and WTO) and reflects not only political concessions to the obsessions of hard-line white supremacy but also – the dominant tendency – a disciplinary apparatus to regulate (not end or reverse) the migration of tractable labor pools, secure trade relations and so on.[[5]](#footnote-5) ¶ We see this contingency at work again in the fact that racial profiling, to return to our central point, is operative for blacks anywhere and anytime whereas for Latinos or certain Asian Americans it is more or less confined to poor or working class neighborhoods.[[6]](#footnote-6) Residential segregation as well is a class-bound issue for Latinos and Asian Americans; for blacks it is a cross-class phenomenon, so much so that even the most segregated Asian Americans – including many Southeast Asian refugees – are more integrated than the most integrated middle class blacks.[[7]](#footnote-7) Poverty is principally transitional for immigrants, but trans-generational and deeply entrenched for blacks (“underclass” signifying a segment of the black population permanently expelled from the political economy).[[8]](#footnote-8) Nationally, Latinos are incarcerated at more than twice the rate of whites but blacks are incarcerated at nearly three times the rate of Latinos.[[9]](#footnote-9) This is all to say that whereas the suffering of non-black people of color seems conditional to the historic instance (even if long-standing) and, even empirically speaking, functions at a different scope and scale, the oppression of blacks seems to be invariant (which does not mean that it is simply unchanging, it mutates constantly). This sort of comparative analysis – which would unquestionably impact the formulation of political strategy and the demeanor of our political culture – is roundly discouraged, however, by the silencing mechanism of choice today in progressive political and intellectual circles: don’t play Oppression Olympics![[10]](#footnote-10) To tarry with such details, runs the dogma, is to play into the hands of divide-and-conquer tactics and, moreover, to engage a shameful, callous immorality.[[11]](#footnote-11) One notes readily in this catchphrase the translation of a demand for or question of comparison – our conditions are alike or unlike – into an insidious posture of a priori competition – we will win so that you will lose. I suspect a deep relationship between this pervasive rhetorical strategy and the aggressive analogizing mentioned above (all of which all boil down to assertions about being “like blacks” or worse, “the new niggers”).[[12]](#footnote-12)¶ The good news, if it can be called that, is that this effort to repress a sustained examination of black positionality – “the position of the unthought”[[13]](#footnote-13) – will only undermine multiracial coalition as politics of opposition. Every analysis that attempts to account for the vicissitudes of racial rule and the machinations of the racial state without centering black existence within its framework – which does not mean simply listing it among a chain of equivalents – is doomed to miss what is essential about the situation, because what happens to blacks indicates the truth (rather than the totality) of the system, its social symptom, and all other positions can (only) be understood from this angle of vision.[[14]](#footnote-14) More important for present purposes, every attempt to defend the rights and liberties of the latest victims of racial profiling will inevitably fail to make substantial gains insofar as it forfeits or sidelines the fate of blacks, the prototypical targets of this nefarious police practice and the juridical infrastructure built up around it. Without blacks on board, the only viable option, the only effective defense against the crossfire will entail forging greater alliances with an anti-black civil society and capitulating further to the magnification of state power: a bid that carries its own indelible costs, its own pains and pleasures.

**Spade 13** (Dean, Associate Professor at Seattle University School of Law – teaches Administrative Law, Poverty Law, and Law and Social Movements, "Intersectional Resistance and Law Reform," Vol. 38, No. 4, Intersectionality: Theorizing Power, Empowering Theory (Summer 2013), pp. 1031-1055)

More than twenty years ago, Kimberle Williams Crenshaw coined the term “intersectionality” to describe a method of analysis that reveals the dynamics of subjection hidden by what she called single-axis analysis and to suggest avenues for intervention and resistance that are eclipsed by single-axis approaches. Crenshaw demonstrated that projects aimed at conceptualizing and remedying racial or gender subordination through a single vector end up implicitly positing the subject of that subordination as universally male, in the case of single-axis antiracist analysis, or as universally white, in the case of single-axis feminist analysis. The experiences of women of color become untellable ð Crenshaw 1991 Þ . Crenshaw’s articulation of intersectionality brought to legal theory a key set of insights from women-of-color feminism and other critical intellectual traditions about the limits of “equality” and added these understandings to the interrogations of the discrimination principle taken up in critical race theory. What does intersectional resistance look like on the ground, and what is its relationship to law? In this essay, I examine some of the key concepts and questions that contemporary anticolonial, antiracist, feminist resistance employs and argue that the demands emerging from it bring not only the United States but the nation-state form itself into crisis. Understanding intersectional harm necessitates an analysis of population-level state violence as opposed to individual discrimination that resistance movements sometimes articulate through the concept of population control. Social movements **frequently** splinter between those employing a single-axis analysis to demand civil rights and legal equality and those employing intersectional analysis to dismantle legal and administrative systems that perpetrate racialized-gendered violence. This essay seeks to draw connections between some of the key methodologies of resistance utilized by intersectional scholars and movements. I am interested in how these methodologies bring attention to the violences of legal and administrative systems that articulate themselves as race and gender neutral but are actually sites of the gendered racialization processes that produce the nation-state. Intersectional resistance practices aimed at dismantling population control take as their targets systems of legal and administrative governance such as criminal punishment, immigration enforcement, environmental regulation, child welfare, and public benefits. This resistance seeks out the root causes of despair and violence facing intersectionally targeted populations and in doing so engages with the law differently than rights-seeking projects do. Critically analyzing the promises of legal recognition and inclusion from systems that they understand as sources of state violence and technologies of population control, intersectional resisters are demanding the abolition of criminal punishment, immigration enforcement, and other functions and institutions that are central to the nation-state form. Such demands are profoundly perplexing to many scholars, even scholars interested in intersectionality. This essay examines how intersectional analysis leads to the production of such demands and discusses how law reform tactics shift, but do not disappear, when such demands emerge. In the first section of this essay, I briefly review some of the key critiques of legal equality offered by critical scholars, especially critical race theorists. Next, I introduce the concept of population control and highlight the importance of attention to population-level conditions and interventions in intersectional scholarship and activism. The reproductive justice movement illustrates how an intersectional critique of single-axis politics and its demands for legal rights leads to a focus on population-level systems that distribute harm and violence through gendered racialization processes. The reproductivejusticemovement’s critiques of white reproductive rights frameworks — particularly the assertion that reproductive justice for women of color requires interventions into criminalization, child welfare, environmental regulation, immigration, and other arenas of administrative violence — illustrate how intersectional critique and activism move away from individual rights and toward a focus on population control. Third, I take up the assertion from many critical traditions that legal equality or rights strategies not only fail to address the harms facing intersectionally targeted populations but also often shore up and expand systems of violence and control. They do this in at least three ways: by mobilizing narratives of deservingness and undeservingness, by participating in the logics and structures that undergird relations of domination, and by becoming sites for the expansion of harmful systems and institutions. Activists and scholars have argued that the use of criminalization to combat domestic violence and human trafficking constitutes a co-optation of feminist resistance that expands criminal enforcement systems that target and endanger women and queers of color. This analysis illustrates the danger that legal reforms can expand violent systems by mobilizing the rhetoric of saving women combined with frameworks of deservingness that reify racist, ableist, antipoor, and colonial relations. I further argue that equality and legal rights strategies can be divisive to social movements. I use three exam- ples of movement splits to illustrate this: the divide between reproductive rights and reproductive justice, the divide between disability rights and disability justice, and the divide between the gay and lesbian rights framework and the racial and economic justice – centered queer and trans resistance formations that have critiqued it and created alternatives. For each of these examples, I trace how rights strategies mobilize single-axis analyses that, their critics argue, both fail to meet the needs of constituents facing intersectional harm and reify harmful dynamics and systems. Fourth, I observe that these critical traditions strategically reject narratives that declare that the US legal system has broken from the founding violences of slavery, genocide, and heteropatriarchy. Critics refute the notion that such founding violences have been eradicated by legal equality. They instead trace the genealogies of purportedly neutral contemporary legal and administrative systems to these foundations, arguing that the state-making, racializing, and gendering functions of founding violences like enslavement and settler colonialism continue in new forms. This analytical move exposes the fact that declarations of legal equality do not resolve such violence and generates demands like prison abolition and an end to immigration enforcement that throw the US legal system and the nation-state form into crisis. Finally, I examine how such intersectional resistance engages with law reform demands. I suggest that rejecting legal equality and using a population- control framing leads to a strategy focused on dismantling the violent capacities of racialized-gendered systems that operate under the pretense of neutrality. I take as examples the involvement of gender- and sexuality- focused organizations in recent campaigns to stop gang injunctions in Oakland, California, and to stop local jurisdictions from participating in the Secure Communities immigration enforcement program. These campaigns have law reform targets yet resist many of the traps of legal equality arguments because they center on the material concerns of those who are perpetually cast as undeserving, because their demands aim to produce material change in terms of life chances rather than symbolic declarations of equality, and because they conceptualize gender and sexual justice and freedom through the experiences of those who are intersectionally targeted by purportedly race- and gender-neutral systems. Through these examples and arguments, I aim both to draw connections between key intersectional methods and to illustrate what forms intersectional resistance is taking in contemporary politics, what targets it identifies, and what demands it makes.

**Passavant 12**

Paul A., Associate Professor of Political Science, Hobart & William Smith Colleges, “Democracy's ruins, democracy's archive” *Reading Modern Law: Critical Methodologies and Sovereign Formations*, edited by Ruth Buchanan, Stewart Motha, Sundhya Pahuja, p. 65 – 67)

Constitutional law in the United States bears the impression of confronting fascism nowhere more disturbingly than in the internment of Japanese Americans, and the Supreme Court's infamous decision Korematsu v. United States upholding the conviction of Korematsu for violating the order, which Yoo cites favourably. How has this case been archived previously? The dissenters in Korematsu recognized at the time that the decision had fallen into the 'ugly abyss of racism', that the 'legalization of racism' plays no justifiable part in a 'democratic way of life' (with Justice Murphy dissenting at 233, 242). One of the dissenters expressed concern regarding the decision's dangerous repetitive potential, as I have already mentioned.

Peter Irons is the author of the definitive study of the law and politics around the internment of Japanese Americans. Discussing his sources, Irons notes that the decision faced immediate and scathing criticism in major law review articles published as early as 1945. Writing in 1983, Irons finds that in the 'years since the publication of these articles ... not a single legal scholar or writer has attempted a substantive defense of the Supreme Court opinions' (1983: 371).

Aside from the fact that this legal decision found that courts must apply 'strict scrutiny' (a legal term of art meaning that the classification in question must be subjected to the most searching inquiry and that there is the greatest presumption against the constitutionality of the governmental policy at issue) to racial classifications, legal scholars do not view this legal opinion as 'good law'. The decision was made at a time when racial segregation was still allowed in the United States, but the Supreme Court found racial segregation to be unconstitutional in Brown v. Board of Education (1954). Law students and others who study constitutional law are taught how the racial classification in Korematsu cannot stand up to the most basic forms of equal protection analysis (because the classification is under-inclusive by failing to include German or Italian Americans, and because it is also over-inclusive by including both loyal and disloyal Japanese Americans; all of this lets us see that the governmental policy is motivated less by security concerns and more by racism).14 The conviction of Korematsu has been overturned because the government was found to have committed misconduct through the suppression of evidence and the inclusion of misinformation. And the United States has both apologized and paid reparations to those interned or their families (Sullivan and Gunther 2004: 668-9, fn. S). As matters of law and policy, everything about Korematsu, except the notion that there is the strongest presumption against racial classifications, has been repudiated and apologized for.

The democratic narrative of Korematsu, based on this archive, is shame and a sense of responsibility for overcoming the outcome of the case, while maintaining the strongest presumption against invidious racial classifications. The ruling was represented as a failure in the struggle against tyranny when it was issued, and in the manner it has been archived since. Yoo's legal opinions attempt to eviscerate the narrative archiving the outcome of Korematsu as wrong, and the principle of racial discrimination as wrong for a democratic society. These, as Justice Jackson recognized, are ruinous iterations. The ideas that a president's word is law or that racial guilt is an acceptable premise for government must be excluded to keep democratic commitments or to send the possibility of a legacy hospitable for democracy.

### 2NC

Yancy Explains

(George, Prof of Philosophy at Duquesne University, Black bodies, white gazes : the continuing significance of race, 2008 p. 229)

The white student's objection raised the issue of how white interlocutors, when in discussions involving race and racism, may (more than they realize) deploy theory as a way of not being forced to examine aspects of their own white subject position. Indeed, the deployment of theory can function as a form of bad faith. **Whiteness**, after all, **is a master of concealment**; it is insidiously embedded within responses, reactions, good intentions, postural gestures, denials, and structural and material orders. Etymologically, the word "insidious" (insidiae) means to ambush-a powerful metaphor, as it brings to mind images and scenarios of being snared and trapped unexpectedly. Whiteness as a form of ambushing is not an anomaly. The operations of whiteness are by no means completely transparent. This is partly what it means to say that whiteness is insidious. The moment a white person claims to have arrived, he/she often undergoes a surprise attack, a form of attack that points to how whiteness ensnares even as one strives to fight against racism. Shannon Sullivan states, "Rather than rest assured that she is effectively fighting white privilege, when engaging in resistance **a person needs to continually be questioning the effects of her activism on both self and world**.,,3 Although there are many white antiracists who do fight and will continue to fight against the operations of white power, and while it is true that the regulatory power of whiteness will invariably attempt to undermine such efforts, it is important that white antiracists realize how much is at stake. While antiracist whites take time to get their shit together, a luxury that is a species of privilege, Black bodies and bodies of color continue to suffer, their bodies cry out for the political and existential urgency for the immediate undoing of the oppressive operations of whiteness. Here, the very notion of the temporal gets racialized. My point here is that even as whites take the time to theorize the complexity of whiteness, revealing its various modes of resistance to radical transformation, Black bodies continue to endure tremendous pain and suffering. Doing theory in the service of undoing whiteness comes with its own snares and seductions, its own comfort zones, and reinscription of distances. Whites who deploy theory in the service of fighting against white racism must caution against the seduction of white narcissism, the recentering of whiteness, even if it is the object of critical reflection, and, hence, the process of sequestration from the real world of weeping, suffering, and traumatized Black bodies impacted by the operations of white power. As antiracist whites continue to make mistakes and continue to falter in the face of institutional interpellation and habituated racist reflexes, tomorrow, a Black body will be murdered as it innocently reaches for its wallet. The sheer weight of this reality mocks the patience of theory.

Yancy 5

 [George, associate professor of philosophy at Duquesne University, “Whiteness and the Return of the Black Body,” The Journal of Speculative Philosophy, 19.4]

I write out of a personal existential context. This context is a profound source of knowledge connected to my "raced" body. Hence, I write from a place of lived embodied experience, a site of exposure. In philosophy, the only thing that we are taught to "expose" is a weak argument, a fallacy, or someone's "inferior" reasoning power. The embodied self is bracketed and deemed irrelevant to theory, superfluous and cumbersome in one's search for truth. It is best, or so we are told, to reason from nowhere. Hence, the white philosopher/author presumes to speak for all of "us" without the slightest mention of his or her "raced" identity. Self-consciously writing as a white male philosopher, Crispin Sartwell observes:¶ Left to my own devices, I disappear as an author. That is the "whiteness" of my authorship. This whiteness of authorship is, for us, a form of authority; to speak (apparently) from nowhere, for everyone, is empowering, though one wields power here only by becoming lost to oneself. But such an authorship and authority is also pleasurable: it yields the pleasure of self-forgetting or apparent transcendence of the mundane and the particular, and the pleasure of power expressed in the "comprehension" of a range of materials.

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(“State of White Supremacy: Racism, Governance, and the United States” (Book Review) August 28, 2012, <http://www.darkmatter101.org/site/2012/08/28/book-review-state-of-white-supremacy-darkmatter-> journal/)

Here, the first two essays discuss racial discrimination in education. George Lipsitz provides a masterful reading of U.S. court cases (including a powerful rereading of Brown v. Board of Education) concerning racial discrimination in education to highlight how racism continues under the names equality, desegregation, and protection. As Lipsitz observes, the wording of Brown allows school districts to declare non-discriminatory intentions without taking reparative action. In this way, the state uses laws intended to end white supremacy in order to preserve it. Thus, the law (like the citizen and the human) is a not a vehicle of liberation but a tool of subjection. Lipsitz’s analysis of legal white supremacy authorized by Civil Rights legislation is complemented by the work of Sanford Schram, Richard Fording, and Joe Soss on what they term “neoliberal-paternalism.” Neoliberal paternalism apprehends the ways contemporary forms of poverty governance resurrect older modes of population management in order to connect them to more recent neoliberal modes of governance. Past forms of racialized state violence become sutured to newer forms of control and punishment. As more and more poor people of color abandoned by neoliberal restructuring are captured by an unprecedented regime of incarceration, welfare has increasingly mimicked the penal sphere. We might add the education system to the massive network of racialized state power outlined by Schram, Fording, and Soss. This almost unimaginable regime of racialized management and control produces a system where, as Joy James writes, “Whites are to be protected, and Black life is to be contained in order to protect whites and their property (both personal and public or institutional)” (169). These critiques of the state are powerfully extended by the work of Andrea Smith and João H. Costa Vargas in the book’s final section. Smith continues the collection’s critique of the law by observing that “genocide has never been against the law in the United States” because “Native Genocide has been expressly sanctioned as the law” (231). Like Rodríguez, Smith argues for a politics of abolition and undoing rather than reform and inclusion. In her analysis of hate crimes legislation, Smith argues that instead of making racialized and gendered violence illegal (given that racialized and gendered violence is already executed through the law in the prison, reservation, and the ghetto), we must make our organizing, theorizing, and teaching against the law. If the state is foundational to racialized, gendered, and heterosexist violence, then the state should not be the mediator of pain and grievance because “the state is now going to be the solution to the problem it created in the first place” (232). The work of João H. Costa Vargas complements this analysis by making clear the ways the law produces anti-black genocide. For Vargas, the black diaspora is a “geography of death” where the premature and preventable deaths of black people are authorized by a “cognitive matrix” that systematically renders black life devalued. Vargas would surely understand the preventable deaths produced by the medical industry as a form of genocide, namely because intent is not central to his theorization of the concept. Instead, creating or tolerating conditions that produce mass-based uneven vulnerability to premature death is genocidal, making white supremacy itself a genocidal project. Accordingly, genocide is at the core of our ethical standards, is foundational to modern politics, and is central to our cognitive apparatuses (269). To challenge genocide we must undo the epistemologies that support systems of value and disposability and make possible the slow deaths that are the “condition of possibility for our present subjectivities and modern politics” (269).

Olson 4Associate professor of [political theory](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Political_theory) at [Northern Arizona University](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Northern_Arizona_University) in [Flagstaff](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Flagstaff%2C_Arizona) and a [social justice](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Social_justice) [activist](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Activist)(Joel, “Abolition of White Democracy” MN University Press, 2004)

Unfortunately, the multicultural and color-blind ideals will not be equipped to deal with it. Multiculturalism and color blindness are means to contain political and social instability (particularly regarding race, culture, and ethnic nationalism) in an increasingly global and rapidly changing economy. As Slavoj Êiêek points out, multiculturalism is the perfect cultural logic for a world in which capital is loyal to no country, religion, or race, yet people still are.69 Tolerance, diversity, equality, and liberal democracy all form the basis of a new hegemonic ideal through which global capital functions. Such an ideal, he argues, must necessarily repudiate the most offensive forms of white supremacy and accommodate some sort of an integrated middle class. Yet it also discourages systematic change. As the new watchword of accumulation in the global era, multicultural “diversity” is not a radical ideal but a corporate imperative.70 Further, neither ideal challenges the passive conception of citizenship that is a legacy of racial standing. Even Fraser’s social citizenship, which combines civil and political rights with the right to individual well-being, is ultimately more concerned with folding economic rights into citizenship than expanding participation in the public sphere.71All lack a participatory element that might fire the American political imagination in new ways. Thus, neither the color-blind nor the multicultural ideal represents a strategy for greater democracy. Both ideals present themselves as alternatives to a world of prejudice and xenophobia. They are that, but they are only that, because neither undermines the political imagination of the white citizen. Of course, not all multiculturalists want to produce a new cultural hegemony for global capital. Giroux explicitly hopes a new white identity can pave the way for a radical democracy, while social citizenship undoubtedly conXicts with globalization as it currently functions. Yet such aspirations are destined to be thwarted without a critique of the white democracy. In the absence of such a critique, color blindness and multiculturalism provide the surreptitious means by which the cross-class alliance persists. As Nathan Glazer writes, we are all multiculturalists now. One cannot open a newspaper, attend a conference, or listen to corporate and academic leaders without hearing of the need for diversity in the workplace, classroom, and boardroom. Unquestionably, this is a good thing. Yet it is not a project for greater democracy. Multiculturalism aims to achieve stability in a global economy. While this requires including people who were formerly excluded from the Herrenvolk democracy, it does not imply expanding democratic rights or deepening citizen participation in those affairs that affect ordinary people’s lives. The color-blind and multicultural ideals’ acquiescence to whiteness is not so much a sign of their hypocrisy as it is proof of the determination of the white citizen to hold the cross-class alliance together in the post-Herrenvolkera. Whether through resistance to analyzing race in terms of power or through a rearticulation of whiteness as a culture that, properly purged of its racist features, deserves recognition with any other, the white citizen still lives, and has a will to live. The multicultural and color-blind ideals are not antinomies but flip sides of the same coin. By abandoning both we abandon the dispute between them, shifting the focus to the role of the white citizen in shaping the democratic imagination as well as in enforcing racial subordination. *The radical democratic ideal,* then, is neither *the refusal of recognition of race nor the equal recognition of cultures or* races but the refusal of recognition of whiteness .Such a refusal opens up space to create new forms of identity—for those who are white and those who are not—amidst a reinvigorated public sphere. Outlining the politics of the refusal or abolitionof white democracy is the task of the Wnal chapter.

Collins 90 (Patricia Hill Collins, Distinguished University Professor of Sociology at the University of Maryland, College Park, Former head of the Department of African American Studies at the University of Cincinnati, and the past President of the American Sociological Association Council, Black Feminist Thought: Knowledge, Consciousness and the Politics of Empowerment, p. 62-65)

A second component of the ethic of caring concerns the appropriateness of emotions in dialogues. Emotion indicates that a speaker believes in the validity of an argument. Consider Ntozake Shange’s description of one of the goals of her work: "Our [Western] society allows people to be absolutely neurotic and totally out of touch with their feelings and everyone else’s feelings, and yet be very respectable. This, to me, is a travesty I’m trying to **change** the idea of seeing emotions and intellect as **distinct** faculties." The Black women’s blues tradition’s history of personal expressiveness heals this either/or dichotomous rift separating emotion and intellect. For example, in her rendition of "Strange Fruit," Billie Holiday’s lyrics blend seamlessly with the emotion of her delivery to render a trenchant social commentary on southern lynching. Without emotion, Aretha Franklin’s cry for "respect" would be virtually meaningless. A third component of the ethic of caring involves developing the capacity for empathy. Harriet Jones, a 16-year-old Black woman, explains to her interviewer why she chose to open up to him: "Some things in my life are so hard for me to bear, and it makes me feel better to know that you feel sorry about those things and would change them if you could." Without her belief in his empathy, she found it difficult to talk. Black women writers often explore the growth of empathy as part of an ethic of caring. For example, the growing respect that the Black slave woman Dessa and the white woman Rufel gain for one another in Sherley Anne William’s Dessa Rose stems from their increased understanding of each other’s positions. After watching Rufel fight off the advances of a white man, Dessa lay awake thinking: "The white woman was subject to the same ravishment as me; this the thought that kept me awake. I hadn’t knowed white mens could use a white woman like that, just take her by force same as they could with us." As a result of her newfound empathy, Dessa observed, "it was like we had a secret between us." These components of the ethic of caring: the value placed on individual expressiveness, the appropriateness of emotions, and the capacity for empathy-pervade African-American culture. One of the best examples of the interactive nature of the importance of dialogue and the ethic of caring in assessing knowledge claims occurs in the use of the call-and-response discourse mode in traditional Black church services. In such services both the minister and the congregation routinely use voice rhythm and vocal inflection to convey meaning. The sound of what is being said is just as important as the words themselves in what is, in a sense, a dialogue of reason and emotion. As a result it is nearly impossible to filter out the strictly linguistic-cognitive abstract meaning from the sociocultural psychoemotive meaning. While the ideas presented by a speaker must have validity (i.e., agree with the general body of knowledge shared by the Black congregation), the group also appraises the way knowledge claims are presented. There is growing evidence that the ethic of caring may be part of women’s experience as well. Certain dimensions of women’s ways of knowing bear striking resemblance to Afrocentric expressions of the ethic of caring. Belenky et al. point out that two contrasting epistemological orientations characterize knowing: one an epistemology of separation based on impersonal procedures for establishing truth and the other, an epistemology of connection in which truth emerges through care. While these ways of knowing are not gender specific, disproportionate numbers of women rely on connected knowing. The emphasis placed on expressiveness and emotion in African-American communities bears marked resemblance to feminist perspectives on the importance of personality in connected knowing. Separate knowers try to subtract the personality of an individual from his or her ideas because they see personality as biasing those ideas. In contrast, connected knowers see personality as adding to an individual’s ideas and feel that the personality of each group member enriches a group’s understanding. The significance of individual uniqueness, personal expressiveness, and empathy in African-American communities thus resembles the importance that some feminist analyses place on women’s "inner voice." The convergence of Afrocentric and feminist values in the ethic of caring seems particularly acute. White women may have access to a women’s tradition valuing emotion and expressiveness, but few Eurocentric institutions except the family validate this way of knowing. In contrast, Black women have long had the support of the Black church, an institution with deep roots in the African past and a philosophy that accepts and encourages expressiveness and an ethic of caring. Black men share in this Afrocentric tradition. But they must resolve the contradictions that confront them in searching for Afrocentric models of masculinity in the face of abstract, unemotional notions of masculinity imposed on them. The differences among race/gender groups thus hinge on differences in their access to institutional supports valuing one type of knowing over another. Although Black women may be denigrated within white-male-controlled academic institutions, other institutions, such as Black families and churches, which encourage the expression of Black female power, seem to do so, in part, by way of their support for an Afrocentric feminist epistemology. The Ethic of Personal Accountability An ethic of personal accountability is the final dimension of an alternative epistemology. Not only must individuals develop their knowledge claims through dialogue and present them in a style proving their concern for their ideas, but people are expected to be accountable for their knowledge claims. Zilpha Elaw’s description of slavery reflects this notion that every idea has an owner and that the owner’s identity matters: "Oh, the abominations of slavery! ... Every case of slavery, however lenient its infliction and mitigated its atrocities, indicates an oppressor, the oppressed, and oppression." For Elaw abstract definitions of slavery mesh with the concrete identities of its perpetrators and its victims. African-Americans consider it essential for individuals to have personal positions on issues and assume full responsibility for arguing their validity. Assessments of an individual’s knowledge claims simultaneously evaluate an individual’s character, values, and ethics. African-Americans reject **the Eurocentric, masculinist belief that probing into an individual’s personal viewpoint is** outside the boundaries of discussion. Rather, all views expressed and actions taken are thought to derive from a central set of core beliefs that cannot be other than personal. "Does Aretha really believe that Black women should get ‘respect, or is she just mouthing the words?" is a valid question in an Afrocentric feminist epistemology. Knowledge claims made by individuals respected for their moral and ethical connections to their ideas will carry more weight than those offered by less respected figures. An example drawn from an undergraduate course composed entirely of Black women which I taught might help to clarify the uniqueness of this portion of the knowledge validation process. During one class discussion I asked the students to evaluate a prominent Black male scholar’s analysis of Black feminism. Instead of severing the scholar from his context in order to dissect the rationality of his thesis, my students demanded facts about the author’s personal biography. They were especially interested in concrete details of his life, such as his relationships with Black women, his marital status, and his social class background. By requesting data on dimensions of his personal life routinely excluded in positivist approaches to knowledge validation, they invoked concrete experience as a criterion of meaning. They used this information to assess whether he really cared about his topic and drew on this ethic of caring in advancing their knowledge claims about his work. Furthermore, they refused to evaluate the rationality of his written ideas without some indication of his personal credibility as an ethical human being. The entire exchange could only have occurred as a dialogue among members of a class that had established a solid enough community to employ an alternative epistemology in assessing knowledge claims. The ethic of personal accountability is clearly an Afrocentric value, but is it feminist as well? While limited by its attention to middle-class, white women, Carol Gilligan’s work suggests that there is a female model for moral development whereby women are more inclined to link morality to responsibility, relationships, and the ability to maintain social ties. If this is the case, then African-American women again experience a convergence of values from Afrocentric and female institutions. The use of an Afrocentric feminist epistemology in traditional Black church services illustrates the interactive nature of all four dimensions and also serves as a metaphor for the distinguishing features of an Afrocentric feminist way of knowing. The services represent more than dialogues between the rationality used in examining bible texts and stories and the emotion inherent in the use of reason for this purpose. The rationale for such dialogues involves the task of examining concrete experiences for the presence of an ethic of caring. Neither emotion nor ethics is subordinated to reason. Instead, emotion, ethics, and reason are used as interconnected, essential components in assessing knowledge claims. In an Afrocentric feminist epistemology, values lie at the heart of the knowledge validation process such that inquiry always has an ethical aim. Alternative knowledge claims in and of themselves are rarely threatening to conventional knowledge. Such claims are routinely **ignored, discredited, or simply absorbed and marginalized in existing paradigms**, Much more threatening is the challenge that alternative epistemologies offer to he basic process used by the powerful to legitimate their knowledge claims. If the epistemology used to validate knowledge comes into question, then all prior knowledge claims validated under the dominant model become suspect. An alternative epistemology challenges all certified knowledge and opens up the question of whether what has been taken to be true can stand the test of alternative ways of validating truth. The existence of a self-defined Black women’s standpoint using an Afrocentric feminist epistemology calls into question the content of what currently passes as truth and simultaneously challenges the process of arriving at the truth.

1. Quiroz-Martínez, Julie, “Missing Link,” *Colorlines* 4:2 (2001). Available online: (http://www.arc.org/C\_Lines/CLArchive/story4\_2\_01.html). [↑](#footnote-ref-1)
2. Conflicts arise between the native born black population and black immigrant groups as well, however black immigrants do not have available to them the racial capital of non-black immigrants of color. They find themselves, in other words, consistently folded back into the spaces of homegrown blackness, as it were, and subject to the same protocols of violence, especially in subsequent generations. It gets worse, not better, as is the case with most immigrants. Moreover, a good number of the most sensational conflicts between “blacks and immigrants,” as the dichotomy is typically drawn, involve black immigrants against other non-black immigrant groups. Black immigrants do not, then, so much disrupt the paradigm as demonstrate why it is correct, at this level, to speak of an irresolvable discrepancy between blackness and immigrant status. [↑](#footnote-ref-2)
3. Robinson, Greg, *By Order of the President: FDR and the Internment of Japanese Americans* (Cambridge: Harvard UP, 2003). [↑](#footnote-ref-3)
4. Deffeyes, Kenneth, *Hubbert’s Peak: The Impeding World Oil Shortage* (Princeton: Princeton UP, 2003); Michael Klare, *Resource Wars: The New Landscape of Global Conflict* (New York: Owl Books, 2002); Peter Dale Scott, *Drugs, Oil, and War: The United States in Afghanistan, Columbia, and Indochina* (New York: Rowman & Littlefield, 2003). [↑](#footnote-ref-4)
5. Estevedeordal, Antoni et al, eds., *Integrating the Americas: FTAA and Beyond* (Cambridge: Harvard UP, 2004); Peter Hakim & Robert Litan, eds., *The Future of North American Integration: Beyond NAFTA* (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 2000); John Ravenhill, *Asian Pacific Economic Cooperation: The Construction of Pacific Rim Regionalism* (New York: Cambridge UP, 2001). [↑](#footnote-ref-5)
6. Goldberg, Jeffrey, “The Color of Suspicion,” *The New York Times Magazine* (July 20, 1999). Available online: (http://www.nytimes.com/library/magazine/home/19990620mag-race-cops.html). [↑](#footnote-ref-6)
7. Massey, Douglass, “The Residential Segregation of Blacks, Hispanics, and Asians, 1970-1990,” Gerald Jaynes, ed., *Immigration and Race: New Challenges for American Democracy* (New Haven: Yale UP, 2000). [↑](#footnote-ref-7)
8. Wilson, William Julius, *The Truly Disadvantaged: The Inner City, the Underclass, and Public Policy* (Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1987). [↑](#footnote-ref-8)
9. Human Rights Watch, “Race and Incarceration in the United States: Human Rights Watch Press Backgrounder” (2002). Available online: (http://www.hrw.org/backgrounder/usa/race/). This fact is mediated by longstanding US imperial interventions across Latin America for the purposes of regulating drug production, distribution, and consumption. See Curtis Marez, *Drug Wars: The Political Economy of Narcotics* (Minneapolis: Univ. of Minnesota Press, 2004), for a detailed treatment of this history. [↑](#footnote-ref-9)
10. See, for instance, Elizabeth Martínez, *De Colores Means All of Us: Latina Views for a Multi-Colored Century* (Boston: South End Press, 1998). [↑](#footnote-ref-10)
11. Of course, this dogma is aided and abetted by certain black leaders as well. Take, for instance, the chastising statement made recently by the longtime civil rights activist, Rev. Richard Lowery, on the occasion of the Immigrant Workers Freedom Ride: “We may have come over on different ships but we’re all in the same damn boat now.” Chris McGann, “Busloads of Activists,” *Seattle Post-Intelligencer* (July 8, 2003). Available online: (http://seattlepi.nwsource.com/local/129926\_freedom08.html). [↑](#footnote-ref-11)
12. See, for instance, Hasham Aidi, “Jihadis in the Hood,” included in this volume. [↑](#footnote-ref-12)
13. Hartman, Saidiya, “The Position of the Unthought: An Interview with Frank Wilderson,” *Qui* *Parle* 13:2 (2003). [↑](#footnote-ref-13)
14. Something similar can be said about hip hop as a multiracial culture of *resistance*. The ubiquity of “nigga” as a term of address among non-blacks, including many whites, may provide a potent enjoyment of one’s defiant sense of marginalization – degradation measured by one’s proximity to blacks, literally or figuratively – but it has only contributed to the *loss* of clarity, not a refinement, and the *blunting* of analysis, not an expansion. No doubt, hip hop brings people together, particularly young people – “one love” – but so do football games and Young Democrats meetings. If we are being honest, we must concede that, as a rule, hip hop promotes political obscurantism, even when self-described as “conscious.” Political radicalism in this realm is exceptional. [↑](#footnote-ref-14)